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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

M. WEBER'S "IDEAL TYPE" IN PSYCHOLOGY

THE problem of "type" in its various aspects presents one of the central problems of contemporary German psychology. It is linked up with most of the chief controversial questions: the problem of "understanding";[1] individuality viewed logically versus individuality viewed psychologically; "personalistic" ways of interpretation versus "impersonalistic" explanations, *etc.* In this paper, the influence of Max Weber's "Idealtypus" upon psychology will be considered.

This "Idealtypus," which, according to H. Kantorowicz, belongs to the "bedeutendsten Bereicherungen der neueren deutschen Wissenschaftstheorie," originated in sociology. It then became of importance not only in psychology and psychopathology, but also in history and philosophy of history. It is Karl Jaspers who attributes to this type a preëminent significance in psychology and psychopathology.

It should be emphasized at the very beginning that with Weber we do not have to deal with a type classification of some kind. Max Weber[2] starts emphasizing the distinctiveness of the methodology of "cultural science." No system of conceptual laws, however perfect, can elucidate the meaning of a cultural manifestation, because cultural events presuppose the value import; that is, in the cognizing of a cultural event only a certain definite part becomes significant. In this process of cognition the "ideal type" plays a definite rôle. In speaking of an ideal type Weber does not mean anything "exemplary" or "average." It is evident that we have here to do with an ideal (in the logical sense), with a concept which is obtained through exaggeration of certain elements of experience, "durch Zusammenschluss einer Fülle von diffus und diskret, hier mehr, dort

[1] Also one of the chief problems of the next international congress of psychology, Sept. 6–11, 1926. "Understanding and explanation"—symposium by Binswanger, Jaspers, and Spranger.

[2] M. Weber, "Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis," *Arch. f. Sozialwissench. und Sozialpolitik*, 1904, *19*, 22.

M. Weber, "Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie," *Logos*, 1913, *4*, 253.

weniger, stellenweise gar nicht vorhandener *Einzelerscheinungen.*" "Es handelt sich um die Konstruktion von Zusammenhängen, welche unserer Phantasie als zulänglich motiviert und also 'objektiv' möglich, unserem nomologischen Wissen als adäquat erscheinen." It is now the task of investigation to determine in every individual case how reality deviates from this ideal type. *A priori* it can never be decided whether this type is a pure fantasy or a scientifically fruitful conception. Only later investigation can set this question at rest. Thus all representations of ideal types—for example, of the "essence" of Christianity—are necessarily and always only of very relative and problematic validity if they are viewed as historical representations of the *empirically* existent; although, on the other hand, they are of high heuristic value for investigation, of great systematic value for representation, if they are used as conceptual instruments for "comparison" and for "measurement" of reality. The ideal type, thus, is not an evaluation. Weber would have it that there are ideal types of brothels as well as ideal types of religions. And of the first there are ideal types of some which from the point of view of present social ethics are technically useful, while there are others of which the exact opposite is true. In general, the "Idealtypus" is constructed for heuristic purposes: it has fulfilled its logical task if it has demonstrated its own unreality by showing that it does not conform to objective reality.

Before we enter a discussion of the psychological ideal type as presented by K. Jaspers a comparison of Weber's "ideal type" and Spranger's "ideal types"[3] is to be made. Neither Weber nor Spranger is dealing with empirical individuals. In either case types are "schemata of comprehensibility." But it is to be noted (1) that Spranger's type concept implies a reference to value, while Weber's ideal type is designed to point the way in the formulation of hypotheses, thus being merely a methodological instrument of investigation; (2) that Spranger's types are supposed to be the final outcome after "faithful observation" of reality, while Weber's ideal types have not this foundation in observation. Observation of some individual instances suffices for the construction of such types. It will perhaps appear later that only a pure "Gedankenspiel" has been constructed. The question of whether Weber's types play the part attributed to them in the social sciences need not here concern us.

What, now, is their significance for psychology? To answer this

[3] E. Spranger, *Lebensformen*, Halle: M. Niemeyer. Compare also H. Klüver, "The Problem of Type in 'Cultural Science Psychology,'" *Journ. of Philos.*, 1925, *22*, 225.

question we turn to the work of K. Jaspers.[4] In the case of Jaspers as well as that of Weber there is no question of a new "discovery." A procedure which has long been used is brought to explicit methodological formulation. Thus Jaspers believes that perspicacious investigators "instinctively" make use of ideal types. One has constructed, *e.g.*, the "ideal type" of mania (gaiety plus incoherence plus pressure of emotion) or of the hysterical character. Such a method does not result in unrelated enumerations *ad infinitum*, but discovers relationships which are ordered and meaningful. "Evidence" is the basis for emphasizing certain features of the ideal type. By this type one finally measures *actual* cases.

What, however, is meant by the "evidence" of intelligible relations? Jaspers distinguishes—and this distinction is becoming more and more current—"verständliche" and "kausale Zusammenhänge." Relationships of the *first* kind involve understanding through self-projection. We understand how a certain mental state arises genetically from another mental state. In relationships of the *second* kind we explain causally by establishing objective relations between several elements on the basis of many experiences. Again, the "genetic" understanding is placed in opposition to the "static" understanding, which is a "Sichvergegenwärtigen" of states of consciousness, a "Sich-zur-Gegebenheit-bringen" of mental qualities. To arrive at a "static" understanding is the task of "phenomenology." The genetic understanding can be rational or one of *Einfühlung*. I can grasp rationally the ideas of a paranoiac, but I approach real psychological understanding when I interpret these ideas as thoughts developing from the moods, wishes, and fears of a human being. "Der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung steht die anschauliche Vergegenwärtigung, der kausalen Erklärung das psychologische Verstehen gegenüber." Again and again Jaspers warns against confusing the *insight* into an "intelligible relation" (*verständlicher Zusammenhang*) with the insight into the *frequency* of the real occurrence of the relation in question. The frequency of the occurrence of an

[4] K. Jaspers, *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, Berlin, Springer, 1913, pp. 339. See also "Kausale und verständliche Zusammenhänge zwischen Schicksal und Psychose bei der Dementia præcox," *Zsch. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat.*, 1913, *14*. See also *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Berlin, Springer, 1922, pp. xii + 486. Compare J. H. van der Hoop, "Über die kausalen und verständlichen Zusammenhänge nach Jaspers," *Zsch. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat.*, 1921, *68*, 9; A. Kronfeld, *Das Wesen der psychiatrischen Erkenntnis*, Berlin, J. Springer, 1920, pp. ix + 485. For the general discussion of psychological types in Germany, see O. Selz, *Über die Persönlichkeitstypen und die Methoden ihrer Bestimmung*, Jena, G. Fischer, 1924, pp. 44; H. Klüver, "An Analysis of Recent Work on the Problem of Psychological Types," *Journ. of Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*, 1925, *62*, 561.

intelligible relation proves nothing with respect to its greater or less intelligibility.

Even this short account shows that a discussion of the psychological ideal type is impossible without reverting to the problem of understanding. In general, one is struck here by a close relationship with Simmel. It will be remembered that for Simmel, there is (1) a necessity understood "aus Naturgesetzen" (apparently Jaspers' causal relations); (2) a logical necessity with which the contents of psychic life associate themselves (compare Jaspers' "rationales Verstehen"); (3) a *meaning*: *i.e.*, the elements of psychic life receive a unity which by its very nature can not be demonstrated, but only intuited.

It is clear that in Jaspers' case we do not deal with types of personality alone. The influence of M. Weber would suffice to demonstrate this. There are also ideal types of diseases. It is clear, too, that there is here no reference to a definite value. The psychological ideal types of Jaspers arise from the evidence of "intelligible relations."

This "verstehende Psychologie" which considers it essential to work with ideal types gives the right point of departure for a consideration of the typology of "Weltanschauungen" as undertaken by Jaspers. Here also it is not through comparison of a certain number of cases that types are formulated. For Jaspers the past is what the clinic is for psychopathologists: it furnishes illustrations. Thus we have a construction of types which are sometimes illustrated by particular cases, but are not *proved* by them. Certainly, the longed-for "inductions solides qui feront la typologie de l'avenir"[5] are not the basis for these types. An inductive approach in this matter does not even seem desirable to Jaspers. The types are presented as self-evident. We are not dealing with averages, but with "specific structures" which may be very infrequent. Jaspers states: "Unser Feld ist nicht etwa das, was wir sehen, wenn wir beispielsweise 100 Menschen aus unserer Umgebung untersuchten, sondern das Material, das entsteht, wenn wir sehen, was wir in historischer und innerer lebendiger und gegenwärtiger Erfahrung an Eigentümlichem wahrnehmen, selbst wenn es einmalig ist, wenn es nur typisch zu sehen und zu konstruieren ist." Thus the individual case as such is not important; the "type" viewed from the standpoint of the individual is always "false." For selection of types there is no proof which the sensationalist or empiricist would cite, but only the evidence of "Anschauung." Correctness means for Jaspers only visibility and clearness. With regard to a psychology of Weltan-

[5] Compare *Arch. de psychol.*, 1922, *18*, 208.

schauungen the following factors have to be distinguished: (1) the Weltanschauung, (2) the individual as bearer of the Weltanschauung, (3) the relation of one to the other. In other words: at the beginning we have the subject—object division. This leads, on the one hand, to a study of the "attitudes"; on the other hand, to a study of the "world views" (*Weltbilder*). Attitudes and world views: that means subjective process and objective expression. Thus the Weltanschauung is not analyzed, is not judged from the standpoint of its truth and value; it is considered to be an *expression* for our subjectivity. Of course, not everything can be explained by a particular attitude. One must choose: "was allerdings charakteristisch ist, das wählt unser Instinkt."

What attitudes are possible? Jaspers declares that there are three completely different attitudes: (1) the objective attitude, (2) the self-reflective attitude, (3) the enthusiastic attitude. We can not give here an exposition of the way in which Jaspers deduces these attitudes. He states that all attitudes have at some time been generalized, and it is his belief that especially these generalizations bring out the characteristics of certain specific traits in detail.

The same is supposed to be true of the "world views." A "survey of the possible types of world views" must—from Jaspers' point of view—bring to light "the basic distinctions and principles." It is to be noted, however, that a psychological study of world views will be influenced by one's own world view. Thus the psychological observer has certain limitations. "Die Naivität, das eigene Weltbild für das Weltbild zu halten, kann er wohl theoretisch, aber nur in geringem Masse lebendig überwinden." In the world view of the individual one must furthermore distinguish: (1) the world which is experienced and has grown in the course of life, not formulated and not conscious; (2) the objective and known world about which a person can give information; (3) the world which is known but not experienced.

Of what kind are these conscious and unconscious world views? Jaspers recognizes (1) the sensuo-spatial world view; (2) the psychic-cultural world view; (3) the metaphysical world view. In the sensuo-spatial world view, *e.g.*, a mechanistic, a technical, a historical, and a mythical world view are distinguished. It is, however, not a question of choice between the biased attitudes or the different world views. One might be capable of all attitudes, of knowing of all world views; but such a man could not exist if these elements did not constitute for him a medium through which *something* becomes important for him. "Es muss auf etwas ankommen, etwas sich lohnen."

In consequence where we have to do with relations between attitudes and world views evaluation plays an important rôle. Thus the problem of value, the scale of value, and the value conflict in man become for Jaspers the ultimate problems of a psychology of Weltanschauungen. Consequently he describes his "Geistestypen" in terms of "attitude," "world view," and "evaluation." It is clear that these Geistestypen—constancy or lability with respect to evaluations, *e.g.*, may be a distinguishing characteristic—are not mere characterological types. Jaspers' insistence is on broad distinctions. He is concerned only with the most general types. In a more specific way he would, however, determine types of Weltanschauung in the different spheres of art, religion, science, in *Lebensstil, etc.* The last step, then, would be of a casuistical nature; *e.g.*, one could demonstrate the Weltanschauung of Strindberg or of Nietzsche, *etc.*

Jaspers' study creates an impression of distaste of everything that smacks of a neat logical classification. It appears, furthermore, that this psychology of Weltanschauung never leaves the ground of general observation. Jaspers himself emphasizes the relativity of his formulations; he points out that every type construction is "nicht etwa *die* richtige, sondern relativ richtig auf dieses Ganze." But this whole must nevertheless be correct. In what does this whole consist? It shall be nothing more than what "every gifted, intelligent person" knows "directly" and "instinctively." *Anschauung* (immanent inspection) is supposed to show us whether the whole is viewed correctly or not. Jaspers' attempt can not be evaluated without analyzing the methodological significance of Anschauung which furnishes evidence. A discussion of Anschauung—one of the central concepts of Husserl—involves consideration of one of the most complicated questions of phenomenology and would take us too far afield. It should be noted, however, that Jaspers' Anschauung is not identical with the Anschauung of phenomenology. Jaspers simply demands that his work should not be interpreted as a sum of logical deductions. He begins with Anschauung and, finally, puts in order, classifies, and describes, *etc.* But description is with him only a matter of presentation, a necessary evil.

We must bear in mind the implication of Jaspers' work. He, the physician, in the attempt to create a "psychological psychology," as Arthur Stein calls it, takes the Anschauung as his technic. This Anschauung is not identical with intuition in the usual sense of the word; the subjective factor, however, can not be eliminated. Jaspers dispenses intentionally with completeness: he requires completeness neither of viewpoint nor of material. Furthermore, the An-

schauung is the Anschauung of the individual Jaspers. Even if it were true that each of the accounts presented in the typology of Weltanschauungen is entirely based upon Anschauung, then the limits of this Anschauung are indeed the limits of Jaspers. Here no other way can be chosen: the only objectivity is found in Anschauung, in the application of a—in a certain sense—subjective method. But to say what every intelligent person knows "directly" and "instinctively" seems to imply that such a person must have written an "anerkanntes Lehrbuch der Psychopathologie" (so Rickert in a controversy with Jaspers about his opponent!) and that he must have read Montaigne, Larochefoucauld, and Kierkegaard, *etc.* In other words, it seems to us that the ability to know and to express the "instinctively known" implies knowledge and experience. To have Anschauung one must have Anschauungen. The worth of a type classification based upon Anschauung is largely dependent upon the individual experiences of the author. The character of the Anschauung, as indicated above, seems to imply that this Anschauung can not be viewed as the instrument of a psychology that is based upon natural science; but—as Jaspers' presentation makes clear—a cultural science psychology is not intended. Cultural sciences, however, play a great rôle for him. A man who has a Weltanschauung is, indeed, a historical and social being.

To summarize: Jaspers recognizes that "ideal types" in M. Weber's senses are methodologically fruitful devices for formulating hypotheses in various sciences. Psychological types, however, even of the most general nature, must be altogether founded on Anschauung. Abstractions like "attitudes," "world views," and the "dynamic" relation of both must rest on "originary intuition," on Anschauung. This Anschauung is to be brought into rational form. To this extent it is construction, but it is construction from Anschauung. Jaspers' treatment is concerned only with the most general types. Thus the author succeeds in giving his presentation the "abstractness of mathematics." Nevertheless, several chief forms of Weltanschauung are described very adequately.

For a discussion of Jaspers' elimination of "alles dessen, was ihn nicht interessierte" or of "was er nicht sah" the reader should refer to the detailed arguments of W. Wirth.[6]

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[6] W. Wirth, "Zur Kritik einer verstehenden Psychologie der Weltanschauungen," *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 1922, *43*, 72. With regard to Wirth's rejection of "verstehende Psychologie" the present writer is of the opinion that (1) the existence of a unity of consciousness does not imply a connection between "verstehende Psychologie" and biological and experimental causal psychology.

THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE EASTERN DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

ON the occasion of the founding of the American Philosophical Association in 1901 William James was invited to become a member. He replied in his characteristically forceful way: "I am still pretty poorly and can't 'jine' anything—but, apart from that, I don't foresee much good from a Philosophical Society. Philosophical discussion proper only succeeds between intimates who have learned how to converse by months of weary trials and failure. The philosopher is a lone beast dwelling in his individual burrow.—Count me *out*!" Although Professor Gardiner, in his interesting account of the history of the Association with which the recent meetings were most auspiciously opened, hastened to add that James, with equally characteristic good nature and will to appreciate, soon repented him of his brusqueness and took his rightful place amongst his fellows, and although the author of the *Will to Believe* later wrote of "really delightful meetings," there was left in the minds of some of the attendants the suspicion that his earlier judgment had possibly been correct.

It is quite the fashion in this cynical generation to feel that we can hardly take very seriously the system of professional academic congresses which yearly brings together some of the teachers of the various college subjects, furnishes them with the opportunity for pleasant social intercourse in most agreeable surroundings at the price of having sundry technical papers read at them, and sends them home again with the comfortable feeling that after all they are quite abreast of the general level of professional attainment. One surmises that the members who do bestir themselves to attend, even those who loyally prepare papers, do not take themselves or their contributions too seriously. It is perhaps as well, for if they did, and if they really believed, as Professor Gardiner asserted, that the programs of the Association meetings represent "the best thought of the times," they might be constrained to lament with a recent critic, "And this was all the harvest!" It would be easy to point to many facts disquieting to an earnest soul: to the slight nature of the papers read, to the total absence of any formal discussion worthy of the name; to the wholly inadequate intellectual reception accorded to the

(2) Elementary acts and higher acts are not identical with elementary problems and higher problems. It is not clear how "the center of direct experience of our self-observation" can become the center in a methodological sense. (3) The assumption that world views are psychical rests on a misunderstanding of the meaning of Jaspers' principles.

two guests of honor on the occasion, the one the representative of a great philosophical tradition, the other one of the conspicuous leaders in the contemporary enterprise to make the foundations of present-day science intelligible; in general, to the inescapable impression of perfunctoriness, futility, and even triviality that hung over the sessions. But this is no new story, nor does it seem likely to be soon a forgotten one; and after all it is a disappointment possible only if one surveys the American scene with the high hopes and with that touch of proudly idealistic blindness so admirably expressed by President Meiklejohn last year.

In another world, in a universe really ordered by mind, where philosophers were actually wise or were even sincerely seeking after wisdom, we might be excused for expecting more. But it is scarcely fair for one who sees us and our activities as they really are, and as under the circumstances they have to be, who does not expect the impossible, but only looks for the best that existent evils permit, to hold up a standard applicable only in a different realm. The Association is fortunate in having cherished for some years a faithful and watchful guardian who, under no illusions about the possibilities of our refractory material, has chided us for our failures and commended our progress, loyally keeping our best interests at heart even when compelled to point out our worst mistakes. It would have been very easy for Professor Cohen to grow discouraged and leave us to our own devices; but without a trace of impatience or cynicism he has continued to watch over our wanderings. Perhaps he can find some slight consolation in the knowledge that his annual papers, brilliant, clear, and pertinent, are universally looked forward to as criticisms of proved and unvarying worth.

Professor Cohen felt that this year he could honestly record a certain progress. The attendance was better than for some time past, in spite of the fact that the meetings were not held in a metropolitan center; the true end of the Association, that informal intellectual companionship so precious to men whose calling necessarily isolates them with only a few friends of the spirit, was well served by the common life generously afforded by the authorities of Smith College. It was agreed that the spirit of fellowship had never been more successfully evoked, nor in pleasanter surroundings. In so far as the papers represent a faithful barometer of philosophical discussion in America, Professor Cohen could report a greater prevalence of clarity of thought and rigor of analysis, and a tendency away from sentimental romanticism. We may have slackened in our desire to improve the world, but we are slowly improving our own thinking. With the exception of the symposium on Time, carried on by estab-

lished leaders, the program was almost completely in the hands of the younger generation; and if we may be permitted a hazardous generalization, it is that such men, if they do not display the fire and enthusiasm that marked the founders of the Association, nor share their penchant for large, synthetic views, are settling down to the perhaps more difficult task of subjecting circumscribed fields and problems to painstaking analysis. In this respect the meetings reflected the philosophical temper of this critical age. There was noticeable also a tendency, more strongly marked than heretofore, to subordinate the onslaughts of polemic to the common seeking of philosophic distinctions and methods that would clarify problems rather than create new schools. The idealists did not insist on their idealism, nor the realists on their realism; nor did either feel the old urge to bait the pragmatists. One received the impression that among the younger men who participated these old shibboleths no longer seem of primary importance.

This superseding of polemic by analysis may, of course, be the harbinger of an Alexandrian age. But it may also be the note of a new and coöperative spirit of inquiry, bred of the scientific temper of mind, seeking to clarify concepts and techniques and to explore subject-matters. What it is destined to become will depend, it seems likely, upon the thoroughness with which the younger men acquaint themselves with positive knowledge and acquire a sufficient grasp of particular subject-matters to make possible a fruitful criticism of method and results. Professor Whitehead afforded a beautiful example of what a thorough scientific training in mathematics can do when it is applied to the philosophy of nature; the pertinence and value of Professor Cohen's criticisms in many fields come as much from his extensive knowledge as from his insight and acumen. Many of the older members freely confessed that they do not know enough either of natural science or of human life to undertake the task, though they are manfully struggling to dispel their ignorance.

Only two of the papers were concerned with the problem of knowledge in its traditional form; all the rest attempted to make knowledge less difficult in particular problems. Even the concern that remains with epistemology seems less in the interest of establishing some particular metaphysical system than in the endeavor to state in adequate terms the actual facts as to the place of knowledge in the world. Knowledge, for the younger men at least, has come to be not so much a problem to be solved as a fact to be construed and a multiplicity of specific problems to be investigated. Of course, ever since the impinging of modern science on the Aristotelian-scholastic conceptual system, the mere fact of knowledge has seemed

to present insoluble difficulties; and it is natural that the academic tradition, feeding on its own past, should still be overmuch concerned with this time-honored bugaboo, in the lack of the factual competence to criticize actual bits of supposed knowledge. But it is not too much to look forward to the time when it will be recognized that the elaboration of terminology is not a substitute for inquiry and analysis, and that knowledge can be construed in various ways upon no one of which the attainment of real wisdom is dependent.

To the founders of the Association it must be apparent that the motives of philosophical inquiry and discussion have considerably altered. In 1901 the main impulse to philosophy was still, broadly speaking, religious; and the strong personalities of that day owed their distinction to the ways in which they found it possible to maintain a religious metaphysic in the face of the negative evidence of science. Even James, the most outspoken critic of the genteel tradition, it appears as we look back from our present vantage point, had really the same problem at heart as his opponents, and stood well in the tradition of nineteenth-century romanticism. The present generation seems to have lost the craving for religious apologetic; even the desire to maintain the scheme of values traditionally associated with Christianity seems less strong than the impulse to subject them to a thorough-going critique. It may well be that one of the tasks of the philosopher in the coming age will be to effect a readjustment of moral values as radical as the readjustment of religious values that on the whole was the outstanding work of the last two centuries. The meeting reflected this philosophic undertaking less adequately than it did the reinterpretation of science; only Professor Schneider addressed himself specifically to it.

With the decay of the religious concern, and with the subsiding of the interest in the problem of knowledge, the older philosophers may well wonder what is to be the future task of their successors. If the interests of the active participants at Northampton are any criterion, the immediate future of philosophy lies in the criticism of the methods and results of the particular sciences, both natural and social. Accepting the common classification of philosophical activity as either critical or speculative, we may note that Professor Montague alone hazarded the difficult task of blocking out a new picture of the world. We may expect that if that is eventually to come, it will be preceded by an extensive period of clearing the ground and assimilating the mass of facts unceasingly turned out by scientific investigators. Only Professor Smart, the representative of the older tradition, was bold enough to assert that philosophers had a loftier duty than to seek to understand science and make it intelligible and

fruitful; but Professor Montague indignantly voiced his rebuke with the characteristic insistence that philosophy must be fertilized by the latest generalizations of the natural scientists.

This much, perhaps, can be discerned if we try to assess the probable philosophic drift by the meetings at Smith; but when all has been said it remains true that progress has been chiefly negative, in abandoning veins whose ore has been assayed as of low value, and that real advance in the direction indicated remains for the future. Only the future will determine whether the newer delving will bring forth philosophic gold, and the future lies in the hands of men who are still hardly scratching the surface. If the meetings of the Association can foster a spirit of common enterprise, and if it can be sustained by the discussions of the periodicals, they can be fairly sure that their existence is justified.

It is difficult to see how much more can be expected from them under the circumstances. So long as the papers are so limited in length, and ideas are presented for the first time to men who find it difficult enough to follow the spoken word, being so accustomed, we may presume, to give rather than to receive, it is impossible to hope for much fruitful discussion. The type of analysis with which the members are chiefly laboring is far more difficult to discuss than creeds flauntingly professed, especially if directed at very diverse problems about which there is little common concern. Professor Gardiner reported that the device formerly tried and often suggested, of printing the papers in advance, had seemed in the past to take the edge off the meetings. It would naturally be so; for the chief charm of the sessions, as at present constituted, lies not so much in any meeting of minds as in the agreeable flavor of novelty with which ideas are offered. The other device, that of scheduling a common problem for discussion, was tried this year, in the symposium on Time, and failed. However valuable the individual contributions may have been felt to be, there was no symposium; the participants did not discuss the same problems, nor did it appear that they had even had the opportunity to read each other's papers, and in consequence the fire was but scattering and missed its mark. But the seasoned observer would scarcely hope for more from any congress, and certainly not from teachers of philosophy.

When one turns from general impressions to report upon individual discussions, the difficulty of summarizing analyses that have themselves been reduced to a bare outline is extreme. In his presidential address Professor Urban essayed the difficult task of discovering progress in philosophy in the quarter-century since the founding of the Association. Such progress, he felt, could be found either in

the elaboration of certain ideas within the bounds of fixed premises, or in the increasing collective consciousness of definite problems; and traces of both types were to be discerned. In general, the period started with the attempt to universalize the idea of evolution, and to formulate it into an intelligible system, and closed with the recognition that evolution is neither universal nor intelligible. The record has everywhere been of the growth of a critical sense that has dampened the earlier enthusiasm of evolutionists. Whereas men formerly assumed that values were determined by origins, they have come to see that the biological and psychological foundation of value is inadequate, and that value is in reality a primitive and irreducible category whose metaphysical status is a key-problem of the present—a problem to which Professor Urban has long addressed himself. Whereas men were formerly concerned with the genesis of knowledge, they have come to a new appreciation of its logical status, and critical realists and idealists, convinced that their differences are not of primary significance, have joined hands in opposing biological views and in meeting the challenge of those who see in truth only a certain value which fictions may acquire. Nor has evolution itself proved an intelligible concept: its limits have been ascertained, and both in Bergson's irrationalism and in the popular doctrine of emergent evolution its intelligibility has been denied. Its place has been taken by the new conception of irreducible metaphysical levels. Whereas earlier philosophies attempted to universalize life and biological principles, there has been a strong reaction from such biological viewpoints to the conviction that evolution is either strictly local or else ideal. It should be pointed out that President Urban's conclusion, that there is taking place a return to metaphysics and a systematic interest, and that the days of "minute philosophy" are ended, was not borne out by the general temper of the meeting, where discussion seemed exceedingly "minute"; nor can it fairly be claimed that the undoubted gain of this generation in knowledge of the world and of man may be chalked up to the credit of philosophy. Its progress must be wholly ideal.

The general sessions were opened by two careful analyses of fundamental scientific concepts. Professor Ducasse undertook to describe the nature of the causal relation in terms of the procedure of scientific inquiry; he believes it more fruitful to ascertain the meaning the term actually possesses for the scientist than to hearken to those whose English has been corrupted by Hume. Investigation never discovers an immutable connection between series of phenomena, it finds only the causal relation between two single events. Mill's mark of unconditionality is based in practice on the experi-

mental analysis of a single case. Nor does the scientist ever regard the whole of the antecedent conditions of an event as its cause; it is only the observable changes in the situation that interest him. His inquiry is, What actually caused one event, and what generalizations can be made? How is the causal relation describable, and how far is it applicable to the future?

Dr. Demos restated in the main the Aristotelian distinction of possibility and actuality as categories that make the notion of becoming intelligible—an example of hard scholasticism warmly welcomed by Professor Cohen. Possibility is as objective and as rooted in experience as actuality itself; change can not be described without it, nor can the past produce the future without its coöperation. Possibilities are causally effective, the tendencies and energies working in the present. Although Dr. Northrop protested that scholasticism is scholastic, and that genuine explanation must come from analysis into simple constants rather than from general metaphysical distinctions, the discussion seemed to agree with Professor Cohen that the Aristotelian category is a fruitful way of describing that fragmentariness of existence that has seemed to the idealists to imply the fact of mind. Professor Whitehead insisted that not possibility in general, but particular possibilities, are essential to the description of the actual, and that the real distinction lies between what in any situation is immediately actualized and the possibilities making for actuality that are excluded in the particular instance.

It was quite fitting, in view of the ascendancy of scholastic analysis, that the Association should have invited a representative of the Thomist tradition to explain to it the theory of knowledge. Father Ryan, out of regard for the sensibilities of his hearers, preferred to speak of dualistic realism rather than Thomism, and to bend his time-honored doctrine to fit contemporary discussion. He insisted on the sanity of the doctrine he expounded with admirable simplicity. Thomism never forgets that the common sense of the man on the street and the achieved results of psychology and physics must be accepted; it assumes that knowledge exists, and is a relation between minds and their natural objects. For it, true knowledge is a normal and natural fact in the universe, a fact to be stated rather than a problem to be solved. Mind is not a sport, nor is knowledge a psychological monstrosity. In analyzing the data of the individual experience of knowing, it is apparent that the mind grasps the universals in external objects under which sensory experience is subsumed: it perceives objects themselves by means of ideas, rather than ideas alone. Concepts are reached by abstracting from the limiting space-time conditions in which they are found; they are clearly a

part of the structure of the world rather than of the mind. This view implies a dualistic metaphysics in which there is genuine interaction between two independent substances, the knower and the thing known, a metaphysics more applicable to the practical methods of science than either idealism or monistic realism. The true knowledge that normally results from this process is a conformity of the intelligence to its objects that is an interpretation of reality rather than a mere copy, for the limitations of human thought prevent a grasping of the whole of reality; but there is no reason to believe that such interpretations normally falsify. The problem of error is a purely practical problem, whose natural causes can be discerned and whose correction is not impossible; consequently Thomism culminates in a philosophy of rational assurance.

In the discussion that followed, most of the speakers, while praising the intellectual cleanliness of scholasticism, seemed determined to convince Father Ryan that he and his master really belonged on their own side of the argument.

Problems of ethics were presented by Professor Lodge and Professor Schneider. The latter also seemed to be hearking back to Aristotle in his emphasis on intelligence as a factor equally important in conduct with the observance of legal and moral principles, and not always completely in harmony with them. As against the accepted identification of social intelligence with morality, he pointed out that life can not always be lived according to rule, and that individual deliberation is often more in the interests of society than the other device of morality and custom. He contrasted the pragmatic method, as exemplified in Machiavelli, with the Utilitarian method found in Hobbes, and accorded them the values of intelligence and morality respectively—a contrast that caused smiles on the faces of the idealists. Nevertheless, though moral rules are but one particular expedient, their existence points to an ultimate quality of human behavior, the fact of social universals—a fact clearly recognized by Kant, though seen by him as dialectical rather than social.

Professor Lodge stated the case for Platonic happiness, or life in accordance with the idea of the good, as an ethical ideal, and defended his interpretation of Plato in his usual sprightly manner. Professor Warbeke came valiantly to the defense of metaphysics against the critique of Kant, with a *tu quoque* that the other sciences display antinomies equally shocking. Professor Cohen pointed out the existence of at least three kinds of antinomies, the practical type dispelled by further instruments of investigation, the type that results from the inability to remain consistent with the assumptions of any theory in thinking it through, and the genuine type that

points to the principle of polarity of Schelling, in which propositions need to be taken in conjunction with their opposites to be wholly true. Professor Drake took the opportunity of contrasting his well-known position of ontological monism with the views put forward by C. D. Broad in his recent volume: the mind is the brain, which is itself psychical in substance, and seeing is imputing to outer objects sensory states in the head. Professor Montague found this view a restatement in new terms of Spinoza's doctrine, which he accused of materialism and of lack of explanatory value; but Professor Drake countered by declaring he found Spinoza unintelligible. Professor Brightman seemed to express the sense of the gathering in pleading for some agreement as to the situation from which thought starts and the criterion of intelligibility.

Professor Cohen's dispraise of life, experience, and reality as eulogistic and explanatory terms seemed to sum up the critical spirit of the discussion and lift it to a higher level. Taking his text from James' remark that present-day philosophy may lack logical rigor, but has at least the tang of life—a judgment, incidentally, hardly true of the meetings at Smith—he called for a more careful discernment of distinctions and ended in a praise of the good life, true experience, and beautiful reality. Mere life possesses no value unless the good is discriminated from the bad; the appeal to life is a form of intellectual anæmia characteristic of a blind acquisitive society. The belief that one can get knowledge merely by living, as found in Bergson, has not the respectability of genuine mysticism, but is only glorified quackery. The use of experience as a blanket term with no particular meaning—a use imputed to Professor Dewey—is the outstanding scandal of recent philosophy, and a revival of the Hegelian absolute in sheep's clothing. Experience is either something personal or nothing; to employ it as synonymous with nature is more anthropocentric than the attitude of the Middle Ages. Even theologians have used the religious experience as a substitute for a sound rational theology, unmindful of the ontological scepticism lying in wait for them. The use of reality as a term of praise is confusing, since it obliterates distinctions; realism in esthetics, either as ordinarily interpreted or in its subjective form as expressionism, forgets to look for beauty.

Professor Schneider pointed out that it is one thing to dispraise the praise of the categories criticized by Professor Cohen, and another to recognize their pragmatic value as denotations. Dr. Demos eloquently and at length upheld the value of concrete experience against the pure humbug of pure reason, whose fruits do not smell right, and urged his fellows to emulate Antæus and fill their stom-

achs. He was reminded by Professor Cohen that no defense of reason apart from life had been intended, that experience without reflection is blind, and that Antæus need not wallow in the mud. Man is indeed an animal with his roots in the earth, but his energies come from the sun. To Professor Costello's remark that we need terms with a certain atmospheric penumbra where our ideas are not clear, Professor Cohen replied that hazy ideas had best be cleared up.

The *pièce de résistance* of the gathering, the symposium on Time, so eagerly looked forward to, proved on retrospect somewhat disappointing. It was not a symposium, nor was there any real discussion; and it was felt that the subject had been needlessly complicated and that metaphors had been mistaken for facts. Professor Whitehead's paper, easily the most considerable effort presented to the Association, had to be curtailed through lack of time; and its ideas proved too novel to awaken any response. It consisted of a series of distinctions and definitions made with the mathematician's rigor to serve as the concepts for an understanding of physical events. In analyzing the intrinsic character of an event, considered as the most concrete finite entity, Professor Whitehead contrasted his view, that the existents into which the world may be discriminated are actual occasions, with the older view that they are enduring substances and with the view that they are mere points in time without intrinsic endurance. He proceeded with careful definitions of his categories of eternality, endurance, and immortality, and sketched his doctrine of the epochal or extensive nature of time—that is, that time is a succession of "epochal durations" or time-atoms, rather than points *in* time, and that these bits of time are given with all their divisible parts. Time is not a continuous process, but a realization of elementary units. In this realization actual novelty enters the world; it occurs through the creativity of nature.

Professor Montague spoke not as a mathematical physicist, but as a *Naturphilosoph* speculating upon the latest theories of science, with a wealth of metaphor and imagery that placed him in another realm from his predecessor, and fairly startled his audience. Time does not flow, but is rather the bed and banks of the river of existence that flows as one whole through it. Time is a fourth dimension into which the universe grows and expands with an irreversible and cumulative motion. The world may be likened to an expanding soap-bubble, on whose surface of the moving present protons and electrons exist as hills and valleys. Psychic energies exist as the actualization of the potential energies of the nervous system.

Somewhat alarmed by such subtle analysis and such high doctrine, the meeting welcomed the refreshing assurance of Professor

Sheldon that time doesn't make much difference anyway. He endeavored to puncture by the hard-headed empiricism of the nominalist a number of accepted notions making of time a mysterious entity. Time is not a uniform flow; it has no duration or continuity; there are no real relations between the past and the present. Time is discrete, a series of discontinuous relational positions. Time is not irreversible; every so-called repetition is a literal recurrence of the same event, and in the inorganic realm at least all processes are cyclical rather than cumulative. Time is not irreducible, it can be expressed in terms of the non-temporal relation of simultaneity with a preceding stage in a necessary causal series, simultaneity being defined as two terms both existing. Even in the organic field the vast majority of processes are cyclical, not cumulative, nor is there any necessary irreversibility even of the growth of a complex organism. In the mental realm it is easiest to turn back the hand of time and dwell in the past. The time-order is revealed at its purest, as a fact of experience, in music.

Professor Whitehead in the discussion accused his colleagues of speaking as physicists rather than as philosophers, and of using the technique of mathematical physics to consider the future as it will be when it is a dead past, instead of recognizing genuine novelty and becoming. He charged Professor Sheldon with denying immortality, the preservation of the past into the present, with caring only for eternal objects, and with having no endurance. Professor Cohen felt that the first two speakers had needlessly complicated a simple and intelligible question by endeavoring to define time in psychological terms. The old definition of Aristotle, that time is the number or measure of motion, is adequate to describe the numerical correlation of events with which physicists are concerned. A four-dimensional world means only that all spatial points are correlated with another number series. To go beyond the constants of actual measurement and introduce a wealth of metaphor, which is then made the subject-matter of further analysis, is only piling up confusion. The practical exigencies of time as marked by the clock put an end to further theoretical elucidation, and the members dispersed without any measurable clarification of ideas, but with the hope that they still knew what time was.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science. EDWIN ARTHUR BURTT. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. 1925. Pp. ix + 349.

Primarily this is an historical study of scientific development, from Copernicus to Newton. The author is indeed to be congratulated on the clarity and excellent proportions he keeps, and on the readability of his style. He holds the attention of the informed reader, even in the more familiar parts of his narrative, while, as a conspectus of a great movement, his book will be of very great service to the beginning student. The chapters on Galileo and Descartes are particularly well done, and if it proved difficult to make Boyle and More equally coherent and plausible, to have emphasized and made clear their importance is a considerable merit in our author.

Since the book is so well done, it is to be regretted that it was not made still more useful for beginners by a little fuller exposition of the specifically scientific work of Galileo and Newton. Professor Burtt enlarges upon the philosophical presuppositions and implications of their work, but just what they positively stand for and positively did, he takes too much for granted. That Galileo was at heart an *a priori* reasoner may indeed be true. But after all he revolutionized science because he did some experiments. They were simple experiments, such as might be described in a few words. Those experiments were very simple, a minimum of apparatus, a few measurements, but they had never been done before, doubtless because they were so apparently trivial that nobody before had thought them worth the doing. Yet from them experimental science is born, and civilization enters on a new era. And again, there are those simple-looking theorems of the early pages of Newton's *Principia*, which also can be described in a few words. But in them there is something more than a few new mathematical proofs. In them, indeed, the Aristotelian world-scheme was finally swept away, and the laws of earthly motion extended to the skies. But furthermore, in them, and not in Kepler's laws or Galileo's empirically-found equations of motion, is mathematics first wedded to physical science. For in them necessary reasoning moves on its own courses, and to its own self-established conclusions, and yet the outcome is truth of physical fact. It was not that mathematics was extended to the heavens. It was not merely that the planets did move in ellipses. That had been established as known fact. But here was proof that the planets necessarily move in ellipses. A new sense of necessity, implicit perhaps in all mathematical astronomies, in these theorems

becomes explicit. And, on the other hand, in the *Principia* there is a subservience to an ideal, not of mathematics, but of mathematical exposition, revealing still the dominance of Euclid, and further back, of Aristotle's ideal of a perfect science. This peculiar form of exposition so obscures the actual tentative course of Newton's own inquiring thought that it did no small harm to the subsequent progress of science. Professor Burtt has not let the otherwise uninformed reader appreciate as much of these things as he should. For after all it was the science of Newton and the science of Galileo that made them great, and shaped the thoughts of the world, and not their often borrowed or incidental philosophical ideas. And this science is peculiar, how peculiar we even now scarcely appreciate. But Professor Burtt should, in any case, have assumed a little less in the way of prior acquaintance, on his readers' part, with the scientific work of the scientists he discusses.

In his closing chapter Professor Burtt expresses a regret that these giants of science had so little philosophical power. He believes that this led them to minimize unnecessarily the distinctive place of man in the cosmos. He instances particularly the uncritical way in which they made assumptions about secondary qualities, the colors and sounds that enrich man's ordinary world, too hastily characterizing these qualities as merely subjective. The resultant "real world," "cold and dark and shaking like a jelly," had in it no place at all for man or mind.

I sympathize a good deal with the spirit of Professor Burtt's remarks. But his statement of the case surely needs some modification. Doubtless, if Newton had been a "new realist," he would have handled some matters better. But he might then have been more materialistic than he actually was, if we may judge by some contemporary new realists. To place a colored object in the same field of space with a dance of electrons may, or may not, have its advantages when we are talking theory of knowledge. But it gives us only too little assurance that mind could turn one electron from its established pathway. We may with some new realists believe that when we look at the spiral in Andromeda we are actually looking back into the past of ten hundred thousand years ago. But those millions of flaming suns, shrunk as they are to the apparent dimensions of a feeble star, as we see them across six quintillion miles of intervening space, do of themselves minimize most painfully man's conceit of place and importance in the scheme of things. It is the facts of science, and not the speculations of scientists, that still give a sting to the naturalist contentions. As modern American business is said to be Puritanism with religion left out, so much of modern science

is Newton's with God left out. But it is not likely that any monist or other theory of knowledge could have prevented this development, and saved the Newtonian deist God, who stood, as it were, with monkey-wrench and oil-can, to make emergency repairs on his world machine.

Yet we may grant also that there is an element of truth in what Professor Burtt says. An account of perception which puts it inside a brain-cell may be symptomatic of a wider philosophical incompetence. And a theory of the world that, if true, makes it an incredible miracle that theories of the world exist, is, to say the least, in an awkward position. There are advantages in the tendency of scientists to ignore difficulties which are not on the main line of science's momentary advance. It makes science possible, and advance possible. But it means, also, that the scientist is working under an hypothesis, and the results reached are only provisionally true. To advance when there are uncaptured fortresses in one's rear, is to take a chance. My scientific friends tell me that they perceive that certain problems are at present insoluble, and so, unlike philosophers, they have the good sense to let them slide, and concentrate where something can be done. I do not find that this is actually so. They do not sidestep the difficult points. They dogmatize about them.

We know how it was with non-Euclidean geometry. The philosophers of any decent training understood the possibilities, and were ready for Einstein. The scientists were not. Many of the latter are still dazed by the jolt. As regards the colors, most scientists I talk with evince incredulous astonishment to learn that some philosophers still question whether such qualities are entirely subjective. Our critical realists may say this shows good sense on the scientists' part. But it does not. It is just utter, abysmal ignorance of the data that constitute the problem.

I have come to disbelieve that there is any philosophical problem which can be merely put off or evaded. The supposed evasion of it turns out to be a positive false theory about it. We must add that, unlike certain scientific matters of detail, there is no real philosophical problem that is humanly capable of being absolutely definitively solved, though we may move in the direction of a solution. Why, then, should we be expected to have philosophical beliefs? If you can see any philosophical matter only one way, you are sure to be wrong. Why, then, should one have to choose between being a critical realist or a new realist? One ought to be both, and an idealist into the bargain. Why choose prematurely between these hypotheses, when they are none of them adequately worked out as theo-

ries, and the facts are not all assembled? I like to work, or play, along new realist lines, because I feel there are possibilities here. Some, though not all, of the critical realists seem to me to be following worn pathways that are known to lead up blind alleys. Or to change the figure, to continue to bang one's head, like a bee, against the same old window pane, is the essence of stupidity. Some hypotheses are dead, and had better be buried. But I should like to continue to carry all the promising hypotheses. Why not? It is the only alternative to being a dogmatist—or else being plain blind ignorant. The supposed alternative of calmly passing by on the other side is one that does not exist. With all respect to Professor Dewey on the one hand, and to my scientific friends on the other, I reiterate, that trying to make philosophical problems disappear by ignoring them is as pure self-deception as the ostrich's hiding his head in the sand.

Professor Burtt does, I think, establish his point that scientists and philosophers have been more than once swept away by the prestige of some great scientific or philosophical advance, and led to swallow a lot of uncriticized dogma, because the latter seemed falsely to be an essential part of that advance itself. It was true of Newtonian mechanics, and of evolutionism, it was true of Kantianism and Hegelianism. The whole history of modern philosophy might very profitably be reviewed from this angle. As we look back at, for instance, Descartes, the great and permanent things in Descartes have become so much a part of our whole way of thinking that we forget to what extent he made us what we are. We are like the young lady who said Shakespeare was not much of a writer, he just strung together some trite quotations. So we see now in Descartes only his uncriticized dogmas and his idiosyncratic absurdities, and we say he was not much of a philosopher. So also with Locke. Some, like Spinoza or Plato, conserve their apparent greatness, because they were really so very great that the world has not absorbed all they had to offer. A critical history of philosophy, that should allow for these illusions of historical perspective, and analyze out the real contribution from the uncriticized assumptions, and prevent us from sanctifying the errors of the great, would be itself a notable contribution to future philosophy. Professor Burtt has given us a sketch of a chapter for such a history, and we thank him for it.

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Five Lectures on the Problem of Mind. Being the University Research Lectures of the University of Texas, 1924–25. GUSTAVUS WATTS CUNNINGHAM. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1925. Pp. vii + 120.

According to the psychologists, philosophers who, instead of sticking close to the facts observed by the individual worker, attempt to discuss the problem of mind in the light of historical and contemporary theories get entirely out of touch with "science" and become entangled in problems which are merely traditional; and the psychologists are far from being wrong in this accusation. On the other hand, philosophers assert that psychologists, in attempting to study observable psychological facts without taking into account traditional problems of mind and their solutions, overlook many important facts and get entangled in naïve errors that have been exposed again and again in the history of philosophy; and the philosophers in this assertion show themselves conscious of a real defect in many contemporary psychological theories.

Professor Cunningham's thin volume, which consists of five popular lectures published virtually unchanged, represents a particularly felicitous combination of historical knowledge and appreciation of contemporary work in psychology. Except for a discussion of the relation between mind and brain, in which the field of doubtful metaphysics is narrowly escaped, Professor Cunningham avoids the type of discussion which the psychologist is inclined to designate as "religion, metaphysics, and superstition." His book, which might well be called "The Fundamental Data and Problems of an Adequate Behavioristic Psychology," indicates the general nature of human behavior and the chief problems which arise in studying it.

In starting out to study mind, according to Professor Cunningham, we encounter first the problem of the existence of mind as distinct from the brain or the central nervous system; and this problem is solved by saying the mind "emerges" from brain activity. As hinted above, this particular problem seems to be no problem at all except in so far as it is made one by tradition. While the conception of mind as emerging from brain activity is perhaps useful in criticizing the assumption that the activity or behavior actually found in human beings can be "reduced" to neurological happenings in the brain or central nervous system, this conception, if it is to be retained, might be better expressed by saying that the behavior of the organism emerges from the structure of the organism. However that may be, Professor Cunningham insists that, despite the intimate connection between mind and the central nervous system, mind can not be identified with the activity of the central nervous system.

Certain features of mind, such as cognition and consciousness, can not be completely described in purely bodily terms; and the relation between them and the body is one of "emergence."

After this brief excursion into metaphysics—a shot into the air—Professor Cunningham begins, with the Third Lecture, to place his shots accurately in a more substantial target. In the first place, mind can not be regarded as separated from experience. The thinking substance theories and the Kantian "principle of connection or organization" theories are alike to be condemned for putting mind outside of actual experience. "Sundered from bodily mechanisms and from acts of experiencing, mind is a meaningless abstraction; linked with bodily mechanisms and concrete acts of experiencing, it is a thing of degrees and variations, a process, an activity" (p. 55). "Mind is nothing but systems of responses to environmental situations" (p. 91). When we say, however, that mind is concrete activity, we must avoid Gentile's doctrine, according to which the mind's activity is in some sense within a world of mind in which the mind creates its own environment and is not controlled by external facts. On the contrary, according to Professor Cunningham, mind is not encased in a shell or spun out of nothing—"its warp and woof are the hard facts of things and their contexts" (p.89). Meanings do not lie entirely within the mind. On the contrary, "the content of the meaning of a thing is the context in which it stands and to which it points" (p. 92), and "ideas are discovered by the mind and not made" (p. 119).

In the second place, mind consists fundamentally in the formation of systems of behavior, or as Professor Cunningham says, mind is not, as Russell following the Humean tradition implies, merely a bundle of perceptions, but is characterized by organization. He goes on to identify organization with the learning process, illustrated as well in Lloyd Morgan's experiments with chicks as in human learning situations, and points out that the organization of experiences is a matter of degree. Systems of conduct are built up by selection of responses and by the object's coming to appeal to the individual as "an object presenting a familiar appearance and to be reacted to in a direct and specified manner" (p. 77).

In the third place, we find many levels of mind or degrees of organization of experience. The difference between lower animals and man is that the lower animals have many minds. The monkey who by fumbling learns to open a box containing a banana has acquired a "box-banana-mind"; and the "monkey's box-banana-mind is precisely what the monkey does when confronted by the box" (p. 86). But the behavior connected with the box is not integrated with other behavior systems. The human mind, on the contrary, "through its

capacity to use symbols of a general significance and to penetrate the larger implications of meaningful situations gains entrance into paths that lie beyond the reach of the animal which remains tied down to immediate situations" (p. 87). The monkey's box-banana-mind is an isolated system of behavior which is one of many relatively unconnected systems of behavior. The behavior of a human being is set in a larger context. The mind of a human being, however, is an acquisition and is a thing of degrees and variations. The infant starts out without a mind, without organization of behavior. "For the baby, for instance, the bottle is something which exists in a very limited context. It is merely a something to be seized, conveyed to the mouth and sucked if hunger impels. . . . The time soon comes, however, when the mind of the growing child sweeps out into the broader context of which the bottle is only a part." The bottle "comes to be an object-of-glass and therefore breakable, an-object-with-a-content-that-spills and therefore to be kept right side up. . . an object, in short, which by virtue of its sundry qualities acts as a sort of index finger pointing into the larger environment" (p. 90). In human beings, through a process of symbolization, the organization of behavior proceeds through ever-widening circles.

In the fourth place, it is to be noticed that Professor Cunningham would have us describe human behavior as it is actually observed to to be rather than in terms of a doubtful, abstract simplicity. Though, as has been indicated, mind consists of systems of responses to environmental situations, such responses must not be regarded as purely physiological, as the behaviorist regards them. Some meanings can be described in terms of purely organic responses. Others, however, can not be adequately described in terms of bodily responses. Rote memory, or habit, and logical memory must be distinguished. The kind of knowledge in which logical memory plays a part deals with structures "which function as parts of a context that can be described only as a logical or quasi-logical system." The logical structures which are important are primarily social structures. That is to say, they do not exist in the mind of any one man, but arise from social experience and exist in the social mind. We must not, however, regard the social mind as something separated from individual minds. It is "nothing but a specialized interfunctioning of individual minds" (p. 105), and Social Mind written with capitals is an empty abstraction. The atomistic conception of society is avoided by the realization that social mind "as the interlocking of minds biographical around special types of meanings" is just as real as the biographical, or individual, mind. In modifying behaviorism by insisting that the observable complex responses to environmental situations can not be described in purely physiological terms, Pro-

fessor Cunningham takes much the same attitude that Professor Kantor takes in his more detailed *Principles of Psychology.*

Since Professor Cunningham's book is intended to be an introduction rather than a detailed treatment, no serious criticism of it will be involved in pointing out several respects in which it indicates questions for further investigation. In the first place, if the dangerous notion of emergence is to be retained, it should be given a more specific meaning. While it seems to be used by Professor Cunningham in a legitimate way, it is a word against which we should be warned by the fact that it has lately served several writers as a convenient springboard by which to attain Heaven. In the second place, further discussion of the difference between trial and error learning and the learning which contains in it logical and systematic prediction is desirable. In the third place, the interesting suggestion in regard to the relation of logical responses and learning to language, symbols, and social behavior should be developed. In the fourth place, the process by which an individual becomes a social being should be considered, especially in connection with a discussion of the use of language and symbols. Professor Cunningham indicates that he may in another volume deal in a more detailed fashion with the problems under consideration. The separate publication of the present volume is perhaps fortunate, since it may furnish a basis for significant agreement among scholars who might not concur in the implications Professor Cunningham would find in his own views as expressed in the present volume.

This book seems to be exceedingly valuable, not because it presents any single ideas which are particularly new or original nor because it offers detailed solutions of any of the problems of mind or psychology, but because it modifies behaviorism instead of misunderstanding and completely rejecting it, and because it, after a survey of contemporary and historical literature and after an appreciation of both past theories and present facts, outlines in a clear and forceful style the primary data of an adequate psychology and a sound theory of mind.

C. M. PERRY.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. XXXV, 1. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Modes of Thought: *J. E. Creighton.* Substance, Power, and Quality in Locke: *John Dewey.* Finite Value and Cosmic Value: *L. A. Reid.* The Personalistic Conception of Nature as Expounded in the Sānkhya Philosophy: *A. K. Majumdar.*

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. XXXVI, 2. The Development of Ethical Problems in German Thought since the War: *Bruno Bauch.* Making the International Mind: *C. D. Burns.* The Sources of Natural Law: *William Orton.* Economics as a Philosophical Science: *R. G. Collingwood.* The Approach to the Problem of Moral Motive: *F. R. Morrow.*

Birkhoff, George David: The Origin, Nature, and Influence of Relativity. (Lowell Institute Lectures and Los Angeles Lectures) (A Series of Mathematical Texts edited by E. R. Hedrick). New York: Macmillan Co. 1925. ix + 185 pp.

Cohn, Jonas: Geschichte der Philosophie. VII. Die Philosophie im Zeitalter des Spezialismus. (Aus Nature und Geisteswelt, Band 747.) Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner. 1925. 130 pp. 2 M. (This volume contains the second part of the history of post-Kantian philosophy, and comes down to the beginning of the 20th century).

D'Aygalliers, A. Wautier: Ruysbroeck, the Admirable. Authorized translation by Fred Rothwell. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1925. xliii + 326 pp. $5.00.

Hartmann, Nicolai: Ethik. Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1926. xx + 746 pp. 29 M. ("This work, as opposed to 19th century ethics and its preoccupation with the analysis of acts into will, motive, and conduct, reverts to the problem which is both actually and historically fundamental, *viz.*, the problem of the content of moral values. The author centers his attention on the analysis of values, thereby making an initial attempt at 'material ethics of values' as conceived by Scheler.")

Giese, Gerhardt: Hegels Staatsidee und der Begriff der Staatserziehung. Halle: Max Niemeyer. 1926. ix + 185 pp. 6.50 M.

Isbyam, I. C.: The Ego and Physical Force. London: C. W. Daniel Co. 1925. viii + 138 pp. 5/.

Joad, C. E. M.: Mind and Matter. The Philosophical Introduction to Modern Science. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1925. v + 204 pp.

Joad, C. E. M.: Introduction to Modern Political Theory. (The World's Manuals.) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1924. 127 pp.

Laski, Harold J.: A Grammar of Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1925. 672 pp. $6.00.

Mirabaud, Robert: Charles Henry et l'idéalisme scientifique. Postface de Charles Henry. Appendice—Note sur les travaux de Charles Henry par Victor Delfino. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher. 1926. 108 pp. 6 fr.

Muirhead, J. H., editor: Contemporary British Philosophy. Personal Statements. Second Series. (Library of Philosophy.) New York: Macmillan Co. 1925. 365 pp. $4.50.

Raup, Robert Bruce: Complacency, the Foundation of Human Behavior. Introduction by Wm. H. Kilpatrick. New York: Macmillan Co. 1925. xii + 201 pp.

Richter, E.: Wie wir sprechen. Zweite Auflage. (Aus Natur und Geisteswelt, Bd. 354.) Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner. 1925. 134 pp. 2 M.

Rockow, Lewis: Contemporary Political Thought in England. London: Leonard Parsons. 1925. 336 pp. 15 s. (New York: Macmillan, $5.25.)

Spencer's Data of Ethics. Translated into Hebrew by E. Schmerler. Warsaw: Wydawnicto-Sztybel. 1925.

Smith, T. V.: Notes on the American Doctrine of Equality. Chicago: University of Chicago Bookstore. 81 pp.

La Très Révérende Mère Marie de Saint-Pierre. Fondatrice et première Supérieure Générale de la Congrégation du Sacré-Cœur de Jésus, de Montmartre, sous la Règle de Saint Benoit, 1838–1924. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne. 1925. 29 pp.

NOTES AND NEWS

The annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at Stanford University, California, November 27 and 28, 1925. The following papers were read and discussed:

The Doctrine of Non-resistance and its Antithesis.....*H. C. Lanz*
The Reform of the Leibnizian Monadology.....*H. Wildon Carr*
A Materialist's View of the Doctrine of Levels.....*H. C. Brown*
Emergence.....*S. C. Pepper*
Why *Monistic* Realism?.....*M. W. Calkins*
Value, Quality, and Quantity.....*G. P. Adams*
The Paradox of Implication.....*W. R. Dennes*
Events and Meanings.....*H. N. Weiman*
Schopenhauer and the Contemporary Philosophy of Life..*G. Mueller*
Outline of a Theory of Value.....*D. W. Prall*
Is "Good" Indefinable? A Criticism of Mr. G. E. Moore
H. J. Paton
The Identity of Discernibles and the Principle of Individuation
R. M. Blake
A Liberalistic View of Truth.....*C. J. Ducasse*

Officers for the coming year were elected as follows: President, Professor H. W. Stuart; Vice-President, Professor J. Loewenberg; Member of Executive Committee for next two years, Professor H. C. Brown.